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THE FACEBOOK STATUS THAT SPARKED AN SEC 
INVESTIGATION: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE AND 





Within the last decade, social media has changed the world 
around us, not only in the way we interact with others, but also in the 
way we discover information.  The average person spends roughly 
three hours a day on social media platforms, and it is expected to be a 
$1.3 trillion industry.1  According to a recent study, 50% of people 
learn about breaking news through social media, and one out of every 
six job-seekers successfully attain a job using a social media plat-
form.2  Additionally, 65% of traditional media reporters use social 
media sites, such as Facebook and LinkedIn, for researching stories.3 
The use of social media has become so prevalent that it has 
begun to capture the attention of major regulatory institutions.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “the Commission”) 
recently had the opportunity to address the use of social media when 
Netflix CEO Reed Hastings posted information on his Facebook page 
that the SEC investigated for a potential securities violation.4  The 
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assisting me and providing helpful critiques throughout the writing process, and my parents 
for their constant support throughout my academic career. 
1 Iris Vermeren, How Social Media is Changing the World [infographic], BRANDWATCH 
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.brandwatch.com/2013/08/how-social-media-is-changing-our-
world-infographic/. 
2 Id. (noting that “nearly 90 per cent of job recruiters hired employees through LinkedIn 
alone”). 
3 Id. 
4 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Release No. 69279, at 4 (Apr. 7, 2013), 
1
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Facebook post was a potential violation of the SEC’s disclosure rule, 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Regulation FD”), which prevents issu-
ers of securities from engaging in selective disclosure.5  Selective 
disclosure occurs when issuers of securities release material, nonpub-
lic information only to certain persons, who in turn trade securities 
based on this new knowledge.6  Regulation FD requires an issuer of 
securities to make a public disclosure whenever that issuer releases 
any material, nonpublic information to certain individuals.7  The goal 
in requiring disclosures is to prevent an unfair advantage in the mar-
ket.8 
A “public disclosure” can be made either by filing a Form 8-
K, which is a report disclosing the nonpublic information,9 or instead 
by “disseminat[ing] the information through another method (or 
combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to 
provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the 
public.”10  This broad language regarding an alternate method of re-
leasing information would appear to give issuers flexibility; but the 
SEC maintained the position that releasing material information sole-
 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-69279.pdf. 
5 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243). 
6 Id. 
7 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2011): 
Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any ma-
terial nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any 
person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make 
public disclosure of that information as provided in § 243.101(e): 
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and 
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure. 
8 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. 
9 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that infor-
mation is “nonpublic” if it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to in-
vestors generally). 
10 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2011): 
Public disclosure. 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this section, an issuer shall 
make the “public disclosure” of information required by § 243.100(a) by 
furnishing to or filing with the Commission a Form 8-K (17 CFR 
249.308) disclosing that information. 
(2) An issuer shall be exempt from the requirement to furnish or file a 
Form 8-K if it instead disseminates the information through another 
method (or combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably de-
signed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information 
to the public. 
2
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ly on a company’s website would not be a sufficient disclosure to sat-
isfy Regulation FD.11  Yet, as technology has developed due to the 
increasing use of the Internet, businesses and agencies such as the 
SEC were forced to adapt to the growing demand for technology.  In 
2008, the SEC issued an interpretive release12 to provide guidance re-
garding the use of company websites for public disclosures.13  Within 
this release, the Commission proposed reinterpreting Regulation FD 
to permit posting on a company’s website as a sufficient public dis-
closure to reflect the evolution of technology.14 
Recently, the SEC further expanded the acceptable methods 
by which issuers can appropriately release information as a result of 
the Netflix investigation.15  Hastings’s post,16 which stated the num-
ber of hours of television and movies watched by Netflix customers, 
was under investigation because it was not accompanied by a simul-
taneous release to the public.17  After an investigation, the SEC ulti-
mately concluded that, so long as investors were provided adequate 
notice, issuers may be authorized to release material, nonpublic in-
formation by means of social media in compliance with Regulation 
FD.18 
 
11 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724 (stating, “an issuer’s 
posting of new information on its own website would not by itself be considered a sufficient 
method of public disclosure. . . .  [Yet], in some circumstances an issuer may be able to 
demonstrate that disclosure made on its website could be part of a combination of methods, 
‘reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution’ of information to the 
public.”). 
12 SEC Interpretive Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp.shtml (last visited May 2, 2014) (providing that the SEC is-
sues the releases to publish its views and interpret the federal securities laws and SEC regu-
lations to provide guidance on topics of general interest to the business community). 
13 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,862 (Aug. 7, 
2008). 
14 Id. at 45,868 (stating “we now believe that technology has evolved and the use of the 
Internet has grown such that, for some companies in certain circumstances, posting of the 
information on the company’s web site, in and of itself, may be a sufficient method of public 
disclosure under 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) of Regulation FD.”). 
15 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 7. 
16 Id. at 4 (providing that Hastings posted a Facebook status update that stated “Congrats 
to Ted Sarados, and his amazing content licensing team.  Netflix monthly viewing exceeded 
1 billion hours for the first time ever in June.”). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 7-8 (stating “the steps taken to alert the market about which forms of communica-
tion a company intends to use for the dissemination of material, nonpublic information, in-
cluding the social media channels that may be used and the types of information that may be 
disclosed through these channels, are critical to the fair and efficient disclosure of infor-
mation.”). 
3
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Although this new interpretation reflects the evolution of 
technology, it does raise concerns over whether it could hurt inves-
tors.19  Many investors may be more comfortable with the traditional 
means of releasing information and find the use of social media to be 
a burden and perhaps, even a mistake.20  Consequently, it is not cer-
tain that the SEC’s interpretation of Regulation FD regarding social 
media serves the broader policy goals of the Regulation.  The use of 
social media websites can also have many downsides, such as un-
wanted postings and privacy concerns, since users will be required to 
register by providing their personal information.21  Finally, the lan-
guage employed by the SEC is vague, creating uncertainty surround-
ing which social media websites are appropriate platforms and how 
companies will go about informing the public of their intended use of 
social media. 
This Comment will examine the evolution of Regulation FD: 
Section II will start with an analysis of the reasons for the promulga-
tion of Regulation FD, and then it will discuss subsequent interpreta-
tions due to changing technology and the investigation surrounding 
Netflix.  Next, Section III will explore any controversy surrounding 
the SEC’s decision to reinterpret Regulation FD, including any nega-
tive impacts on investors and potential disadvantages to using social 
media websites.  Section IV will propose possible solutions for both 
the SEC in its implementation of Regulation FD and for companies 
on how to comply.  Finally, Section V will provide relevant conclu-
sions. 
II. EVOLUTION OF REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE 
In 2000, the SEC adopted a new rule, Regulation FD, to ad-
dress the issue of selective disclosure, a process in which issuers of 
material, nonpublic information released that information only to cer-
tain persons, who, in turn, traded securities based on their new 
knowledge.22  The purpose of Regulation FD was to prevent selective 
disclosure in order to enhance the fairness and efficiency of capital 
 
19 Anthony Palazzo, Netflix CEO Hastings Uses Facebook to Announce Viewership, 




22 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. 
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markets, essentially expanding on the legislation enacted by Congress 
in the 1930s.23  The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (collectively “the Acts”) focus on the importance 
of fair dealing and the need to regulate the markets.24  The creation of 
Regulation FD extends from the federal securities laws with the ob-
jective of ensuring full and fair disclosure to the investing public.25 
To further Regulation FD’s predominant principles of fairness 
and efficiency, the SEC has released reports to the investing public 
that establish guidelines for determining the boundaries of Regulation 
FD.26  To ensure compliance, in 2008, the SEC issued a press release 
concerning the ways in which companies could abide by Regulation 
FD through the use of company websites.27  More recently, in April 
of 2013, the SEC reported that companies are now authorized to uti-
lize social media websites in the same fashion, deeming them an ap-
propriate means for disseminating information.28  Overall, the federal 
securities laws influenced the SEC to create Regulation FD in order 
to expand upon the objectives the Acts addressed years ago.  Howev-
er, due to frequently changing technology, the SEC has been forced 
to reevaluate the overall purpose of Regulation FD and to ensure that 
the new interpretations of the rule achieve the goals of the Securities 
Acts. 
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities 
Act”) to mandate that investors receive certain financial information 
 
23 Id. at 51,719. 
24 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited May 2, 2014); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a—
bbbb; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a—lll. 
25 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591 (Dec. 28, 1999) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243). 
26 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 1. 
27 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites, 73 Fed. Reg. at 45,868 (stat-
ing, “technology has evolved and the use of the Internet has grown such that . . . posting of 
the information on the company’s Web site . . . may be a sufficient method of public disclo-
sure under 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) of Regulation FD.”). 
28 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 6-8 (deciding that social media websites now 
apply in the same way as corporate websites, according to the 2008 guidance).  “We appre-
ciate the value and prevalence of social media channels in contemporary market communica-
tions, and the Commission supports companies seeking new ways to communicate and en-
gage with shareholders and the market.”  Id.  
5
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regarding securities being offered for public sale and to prohibit fraud 
during the sale of securities.29  To accomplish these goals, Congress 
enacted a system that required the registration of securities to provide 
potential investors with relevant financial information.30  Thus, the 
primary purpose of enacting the Securities Act was to ensure fair 
dealing and honest conduct within the securities market.31  Because 
the Securities Act was designed to control only the initial issuance of 
securities, Congress adopted the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange 
Act”) the following year to govern dealings subsequent to the initial 
issuance.32  The motivation for creating this subsequent act was to 
govern secondary market transactions and related practices.33 
One of the primary purposes behind both of the Acts was to 
protect the investing public from fraud by ensuring that issuers of se-
curities provide full disclosure.34  The Securities Act compelled issu-
ers to provide “full disclosure of material information concerning 
 
29 Securities Industry, supra note 24 (stating that the two basic objectives of the Securities 
Act was to “require that investors receive financial and other significant information con-
cerning securities being offered for public sale; and [to] prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, 
and other fraud in the sale of securities.”). 
30 Id. (requiring the information to be accurate, so that investors can make informed deci-
sions when deciding whether or not to purchase securities). 
31 Res. Corp. Int’l v. SEC, 103 F.2d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (holding that “the [Securi-
ties] Act is designed, through the imposition of penalties, to insure fair dealing and good 
conduct . . . in the sale of securities to the public.”). 
32 Peoples Sec. Co. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding that “[t]he Ex-
change Act differs from the Securities Act primarily in that it applies to post-distribution 
trading.”). 
33 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010): 
Necessity for regulation. 
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as 
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter 
markets are effected with a national public interest which makes it nec-
essary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of 
practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by officers, 
directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports, to 
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market 
system for securities and a national system for the clearance and settle-
ment of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and 
funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make 
such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, in order 
to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing 
power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system 
and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and 
honest markets in such transactions. 
Id. 
34 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). 
6
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public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors 
against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, 
to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.”35  Subse-
quently, the Exchange Act sought to protect investors against the ma-
nipulation of stock prices by establishing a system of regulating 
transactions upon security exchanges and to require reporting by 
companies listed on those exchanges.36  To accomplish an efficient 
system of regulation, Congress created the SEC, conferring upon it a 
wide array of powers.37  One such power is the authority to promul-
gate rules and regulations necessary to execute the functions of the 
Commission or to implement the provisions of the Exchange Act.38  
As per its enumerated power, the SEC thus promulgated Regulation 
FD to carry out the provisions of the Securities Acts, which ensured 
full and fair disclosure and a level playing field for all investors.39 
B. Formation of Regulation FD 
In 2000, the SEC proposed Regulation FD to address the 
problem of issuers making disclosures of material, nonpublic infor-
mation to select persons, such as analysts and institutional investors, 
and not to the general public.40  The proposition suggested that there 
be simultaneous access of material information to all potential inves-
tors, thereby eliminating any potential biases towards larger, more es-
tablished investors, and serving an essential objective of the Securi-
ties Acts.41  Prior to the proposal, there was no requirement for 
 
35 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933)). 
36 Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934)). 
37 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2010). 
38 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2010): 
Power to make rules and regulations; considerations; public disclosure. 
(1) The Commission . . . shall [] have power to make such rules and reg-
ulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions 
of this title for which they are responsible or for the execution of the 
functions vested in them by this chapter, and may for such purposes 
classify persons, securities, transactions, statements, applications, re-
ports, and other matters within their respective jurisdictions, and pre-
scribe greater, lesser, or different requirements for different classes 
thereof. 
Id. 
39 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. 
40 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591. 
41 Id. (stating “[f]ull and fair disclosure of information by issuers of securities to the in-
vesting public is a cornerstone of the federal securities laws. In enacting the mandatory dis-
7
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issuers of securities to disclose important corporate developments to 
the public as they occur, giving issuers the liberty to decide when to 
release disclosures and to whom.42  At times, this led to issuers selec-
tively releasing information that had the potential to have a signifi-
cant impact on the market price of the issuer’s securities, thereby 
providing an unfair advantage.43  Essentially, selective disclosure 
posed a threat to the fairness of the securities markets by allowing the 
informed investors to immediately use the confidential information to 
make a profit before the information became public knowledge.44 
1. Creation and Importance 
After releasing the proposal, the SEC received comments 
from the public45 and, ultimately, decided that it was an essential rule 
to secure fairness in the securities markets.46  A vast majority of the 
comments were from individual investors, urging the SEC to enact 
Regulation FD, as many of them had been negatively affected by se-
lective disclosure and felt they were at a disadvantage in the market.47  
Further, the Commission considered the commenters’ trepidation sur-
rounding Regulation FD, due to the possibility of excessive liability 
 
closure system of the Exchange Act, Congress sought to . . . facilitate the operation of fair 
and efficient markets.”). 
42 Id. (emphasizing that “the federal securities laws do not generally require an issuer to 
make public disclosure of all important corporate developments when they occur . . . .  
[I]ssuers also retain control over the audience and forum for some important disclosures.  If a 
disclosure is made at a time when no Commission filing is immediately required, the issuer 
determines how and to whom to make its initial disclosure.  As a result, issuers sometimes 
choose to disclose information selectively”). 
43 Id. at 72,591-92 (stating that “selective disclosures have been made in conference calls 
or meetings that are open only to analysts and/or institutional investors, and exclude other 
investors, members of the public, and the media . . . .  [T]hese situations involve advance 
notice of the issuer's upcoming quarterly earnings or sales figures—figures which, when an-
nounced, have a predictable and significant impact on the market price of the issuer’s securi-
ties.”). 
44 Id. at 72,592 (finding that “a recent academic study indicated [that] selective disclosure 
has the immediate effect of enabling those privy to the information to make a quick profit (or 
quickly minimize losses) by trading before the information is disseminated to the public.”). 
45 See generally Comments on Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199.shtml (last visited 
May 2, 2014) (providing the files of electronically received public comments responding to 
the proposed rule). 
46 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. 
47 Id. at 51,717 (finding that “[m]any felt that selective disclosure was indistinguishable 
from insider trading in its effect on the market and investors, and expressed surprise that ex-
isting law did not already prohibit this practice.”). 
8
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for companies, and decided to narrow its scope.48  The final version 
of the rule provides that when an issuer of securities, or a person act-
ing on its behalf, discloses material, nonpublic information to select 
enumerated persons, it must also disclose the information through a 
public medium.49  The amount of time that the issuer has to make a 
public disclosure depends on whether the selective disclosure was in-
tentional or non-intentional.50  A disclosure is “intentional” when the 
issuer either knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the infor-
mation he is communicating is material and nonpublic, in which case, 
the issuer must make its public disclosure simultaneously.51  On the 
other hand, if the disclosure is “non-intentional,” the issuer must 
make its public disclosure promptly, meaning “as soon as reasonably 
practicable,” after learning of the disclosure.52 
Regulation FD was created for a number of reasons, many of 
which have had a significant impact on the securities markets and the 
way that companies disclose information.  The primary reason for 
adopting Regulation FD was to rectify a problem that was outside the 
scope of insider trading laws—those that were not privy to confiden-
tial information were at a disadvantage in the market.53  The SEC also 
 
48 Id. at 51,718 (including specifying the issuer personnel to be held responsible, as well 
as limiting those outside persons to whom an issuer communicates to only market profes-
sionals and holders of the issuer’s securities). 
49 Id. at 51,719 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)). 
Rule 100 of Regulation FD sets forth the basic rule regarding selective 
disclosure.  Under this rule, whenever: 
(1) an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, 
(2) discloses material nonpublic information, 
(3) to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market profes-
sionals or holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the ba-
sis of the information), 
(4) the issuer must make public disclosure of that same information: 
(a) simultaneously (for intentional disclosures), or 
(b) promptly (for non-intentional disclosures). 
Id. 
50 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719. 
51 Id. at 51,722 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a)). 
52 Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d)) (stating that it “defined ‘promptly’ to mean ‘as soon 
as reasonably practicable’ (but no later than 24 hours) after a senior official of the issuer 
learns of the disclosure and knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that the information dis-
closed was both material and non-public.”). 
53 Id. at 51,717; see also Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining illegal insider 
trading as “buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of 
trust and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the secu-
9
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found that selective disclosure led to “a loss of investor confidence in 
the integrity of [the] capital markets,” and it was concerned with in-
vestors’ skepticism about market efficiency.54  Similarly, the SEC 
was concerned that management must be treating material infor-
mation as somewhat of a commodity, using it to gain goodwill with 
analysts or investors.55  All of these reasons led to the promulgation 
of Regulation FD, and because of the technological developments at 
the time, adoption of the rule would be easier for issuers.56  The 
emergence of the Internet allowed the ready release of information to 
the public because it presented a number of new methods to com-
municate with investors.57  Overall, the motivation behind creating 
Regulation FD directly correlated with the principal objective of the 
Acts—to create fairness and efficiency in the capital markets. 
2. Regulatory Language 
The language of Regulation FD provides, “[w]henever an is-
suer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material non-
public information regarding that issuer or its securities to any person 
described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make 
public disclosure of that information . . . .”58  Essentially, an “issuer” 
subject to this regulation includes either a company that has a class of 
securities registered under the Exchange Act59 or one that is required 
to file reports under the Exchange Act.60  Further, a person acting on 
 
rity.”). 
54 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716 (finding further that 
“[i]nvestors who see a security’s price change dramatically and only later are given access to 
the information responsible for that move rightly question whether they are on a level play-
ing field with market insiders” and went on to establish a comparison between selective dis-
closure and insider trading). 
55 Id. at 51,716-17 (maintaining that “in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclo-
sure, analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or otherwise slant 
their analysis in order to have continued access to selectively disclosed information.”). 
56 Id. at 51,717 (explaining that “technological developments have made it much easier for 
issuers to disseminate information broadly.  Whereas issuers once may have had to rely on 
analysts to serve as information intermediaries, issuers now can use a variety of methods to 
communicate directly with the market.”). 
57 Id. (enumerating press releases, Internet webcasting, and teleconferencing). 
58 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a). 
59 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2010) (providing registration requirements for securities under the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). 
60 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2010) (providing registration and regulation of brokers and deal-
ers under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). 
10
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behalf of an issuer is defined as either an officer or director of the is-
suer corporation, or an agent or employee of the issuer who regularly 
communicates with securities market professionals or security hold-
ers.61  By establishing this list, the SEC limited the scope of the 
Regulation to senior management of the company, investor relations 
professionals, and those who regularly interact with the stockhold-
ers.62  Additionally, the SEC expressly stated that a person who dis-
closes information, while also breaching a duty owed to the issuer, 
would not be considered acting on behalf of the issuer and would in-
stead be penalized under insider trading laws.63 
The Regulation further enumerates those persons to whom a 
company may not engage in selective disclosure; this includes stock- 
brokers or dealers, investment advisors, institutional investment man-
agers, investment companies, or any other person affiliated with any 
of the aforementioned.64  These categories generally include any ana-
lysts or market professionals who would likely trade based on the se-
lectively disclosed information.65  In addition to those specified per-
sons, one who is acting on behalf of an issuer is also restricted from 
releasing material information to a person who may be a holder of the 
issuer’s securities if it is “reasonably foreseeable that the person will 
purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis of the infor-
mation.”66  In essence, this section of the rule bars an issuer from dis-
closing material information to those persons who would be most 
likely to receive the information from the issuer and, presumably, 
 
61 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c): 
Person acting on behalf of an issuer.  “Person acting on behalf of an is-
suer” means any senior official of the issuer (or, in the case of a closed-
end investment company, a senior official of the issuer’s investment ad-
viser), or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who regular-
ly communicates with any person described in § 243.100(b)(1)(i), (ii), or 
(iii), or with holders of the issuer’s securities.  An officer, director, em-
ployee, or agent of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic infor-
mation in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer shall not be 
considered to be acting on behalf of the issuer. 
62 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (including any em-
ployee who was directed by senior management to make a selective disclosure). 
63 Id. 
64 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 
65 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719 (limiting the scope of 
Regulation FD to include disclosures made to “securities analysts, market professionals, in-
stitutional investors, or others who regularly make or would reasonably be expected to make 
investment decisions involving the issuer’s securities.”). 
66 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv). 
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trade based on that valuable information.67 
Conversely, the rule also lists the types of persons to whom an 
issuer would be permitted to engage in selective disclosure.  This in-
cludes persons who owe the issuer a duty of trust, such as an agent, or 
alternatively, one who agrees to hold the information in confidence.68  
In this case, a breach of the duty of trust between the parties would 
result in misappropriation under the laws of insider trading, as op-
posed to selective disclosure.69  Thus, the law recognizes that issuers 
may have confidential relationships with persons outside the organi-
zation, to whom the issuer may share material, nonpublic infor-
mation.70  The final exception provides that an issuer is not guilty of 
selective disclosure when it discloses information to an organization 
that is in the business of issuing credit ratings, so long as its ratings 
are made publicly available.71  Once again, these exclusions limit the 
overall scope of Regulation FD, so as to ensure fairness and avoid the 
threat of extensive liability. 
Another important definitional consideration is what consti-
tutes “material nonpublic information.”72  Again, the Regulation does 
not define these terms, but instead relies on the definition found in 
case law.73  Information is “material” if “there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” 
when making an investment decision.74  It is not necessary that a rea-
sonable investor would change his investment decision based on the 
information, provided that he “would have viewed it as significantly 
altering the ‘total mix’ of information available.”75  Essentially, a ma-
 
67 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719. 
68 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i), (ii) (including agents such as an attorney, investment 
banker, or accountant). 
69 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (stating “[a]ny misuse 
of the information for trading by the persons in these two exclusions would thus be covered 
under either the ‘temporary insider’ or the misappropriation theory of insider trading.  This 
approach recognizes that issuers and their officials may properly share material nonpublic 
information with outsiders, for legitimate business purposes, when the outsiders are subject 
to duties of confidentiality.”). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (finding that “[r]atings organizations, like the media, have a mission of public dis-
closure; the objective and result of the ratings process is a widely available publication of the 
rating when it is completed.  [Thus], for the exclusion to apply, the ratings organization must 
make its credit ratings publicly available.”). 
72 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a). 
73 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721. 
74 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
75 SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; 
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terial fact is one that may have a significant effect on the future of the 
company and, in turn, affect investors’ decisions to buy or sell the 
company’s securities.76  The SEC has provided examples of infor-
mation that may be material, including earnings information and the 
announcement of mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, new prod-
ucts or discoveries, and changes in management; yet, this list is not 
exhaustive, and does not seek to ascertain the materiality of the ex-
amples provided.77  Further, it has been determined that information 
is “nonpublic” if “it has not been disseminated in a manner making it 
available to investors generally.”78 
The final issue regarding the language used in the rule is what 
constitutes a “public disclosure” to satisfy Regulation FD.  The SEC 
has determined that “the required public disclosure may be made by 
filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination 
of methods that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-
exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.”79  This 
language gives issuers considerable flexibility in determining the way 
in which to disclose information to the public.  The first option for is-
suers of securities is fairly straightforward.  Issuers can file a Form 8-
K, which is the report that companies must file with the SEC to an-
nounce major events to inform shareholders, including events affect-
ing financial information, trading markets, and corporate govern-
ance.80 
 
Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 985 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
76 Id. (quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849 which held that “[m]aterial facts 
include those ‘which affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect 
the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company’s securities.’ ”). 
77 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.  Such examples in-
clude: 
(1) Earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint 
ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or devel-
opments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g., the acquisition or loss of 
a contract); (4) changes in control or in management; (5) change in audi-
tors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an audi-
tor's audit report; (6) events regarding the issuer's securities—e.g., de-
faults on senior securities, calls of securities for redemption, repurchase 
plans, stock splits or changes in dividends, changes to the rights of secu-
rity holders, public or private sales of additional securities; and (7) bank-
ruptcies or receiverships. 
Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 51,716. 
80 Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/f 
orm8k.htm (last visited May 2, 2014).  For an example of a Form 8-K, see Form 8-K Cur-
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However, if a company does not wish to file the Form 8-K, it 
can instead disseminate information through a different method or a 
combination of methods to satisfy this requirement.81  The SEC pro-
posed possible approaches for issuers to release information in order 
to “make effective, broad, and non-exclusionary public disclosure, 
given the particular circumstances of that issuer.”82  Examples in-
clude issuing a press release distributed through a circulated news 
service, or by inviting the public to listen to a press conference, either 
in person, or by telephone or electronic transmission, so long as the 
public is given adequate notice.83  Thus, the SEC’s purpose of using 
flexible language was to permit issuers to utilize current technologies 
capable of providing public access to the company’s events.84  How-
ever, the SEC specifically stated that posting information on a com-
pany’s website would not, by itself, be an appropriate means of pub-
lic disclosure.85  Issuers’ websites may only be used when there is a 
combination of methods being used to disseminate information, once 
again providing considerable flexibility to issuers.86 
Although the SEC has given issuers flexibility in deciding an 
appropriate method to release public information, it also places a re-
sponsibility on the issuer to ensure the method is reasonable for its 
particular practices.87  The SEC purposely provided this flexibility in 
the manner of disclosure to allow companies to use methods that will 
 
rent Report, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/ 
form8-k.pdf (last visited May 2, 2014). 
81 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 
243.101(e)(2).  “[The SEC is] recognizing alternative methods of public disclosure to give 
issuers the flexibility to choose another method . . . of disclosure that will achieve the goal of 
effecting broad, non-exclusionary distribution of information to the public.”). 
82 Id. at 51,724. 
83 Id. (explaining that an ideal combination of methods would be to utilize a “press release 
to provide the initial broad distribution of the information, and then discuss its release with 
analysts in [a] subsequent conference call, without fear that if it should disclose additional 
material details related to the original disclosure it will be engaging in a selective disclosure 
of material information.”). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (noting that the SEC did not bar websites from being used completely, stating, “[a]s 
technology evolves and as more investors have access to and use the Internet, however, we 
believe that some issuers, whose websites are widely followed by the investment communi-
ty, could use such a method.”). 
86 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. 
87 Id. (finding that “[i]n determining whether an issuer's method of making a particular 
disclosure was reasonable, we will consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, recog-
nizing that methods of disclosure that may be effective for some issuers may not be effective 
for others.”). 
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be effective, while realizing that they may change and develop as 
technology evolves.  As anticipated, eight years later, the SEC was 
compelled to issue a press release interpreting the validity of new 
methods. 
C. 2008 Interpretive Release 
Given the speed with which technology was advancing and 
the development of company websites, in 2008 the SEC issued a 
press release88 to provide guidance regarding the use of company 
websites to meet the disclosure requirement of Regulation FD.89  The 
primary focus of the press release was on the SEC’s new interpreta-
tion of what is considered “public” for purposes of Regulation FD, 
pertaining to information posted on company websites.90  At the time 
of the proposal, the emergence of the Internet was modernizing the 
way a company could release information about itself and its securi-
ties, in turn, promoting the efficiency of the trading markets.91  The 
advancements in technological communications have led to more 
timely disclosures and the effortless ability to disseminate those dis-
closures to the market.92  Thus, by having ready access to company 
information, investors began to rely on company websites as a vital 
source of information to facilitate investment decisions.93 
Considering the significant technological advances at the time 
and the increased use of the Internet by investors, the SEC elected to 
 
88 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites, 73 Fed. Reg. at 45,863 (ap-
plying also to other antifraud provisions and certain Exchange Act provisions of the federal 
securities laws). 
89 SEC Interpretive Releases, supra note 12.  “The Commission occasionally provides 
guidance on topics of general interest to the business and investment communities by issuing 
‘interpretive’ releases, in which [the Commission] publish[es] [its] views and interpret[s] the 
federal securities laws and SEC regulations.”  Id. 
90 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites, 73 Fed. Reg. at 45,863. 
91 Id. (citing The Impact of Recent Technological Advances on the Securities Markets, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.ht 
m (last visited May 2, 2014) (illustrating that the SEC analyzed the benefits of the increased 
use of technology for investors and the securities markets)). 
92 Id. (citing Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Release No. 34-55146, at 8 (Jan. 22, 
2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-55146.pdf (finding that approximately 80% 
of investors in mutual funds have access to the Internet)). 
93 Id. (quoting Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning 
Web Site Access to Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,480, 58,492 (Sept. 16, 2002) (“Online access to 
Internet information also helps to democratize the capital markets by enabling many small 
investors to access corporate information.”)). 
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provide guidance in determining whether a disclosure on a company 
website would be considered “public,” in that it would comply with 
Regulation FD.94  To offer guidance pertaining to this issue, the SEC 
found that in order for information to become public, “it must be dis-
seminated in a manner calculated to reach the securities market place 
in general through recognized channels of distribution, and public in-
vestors must be afforded a reasonable waiting period to react to the 
information.”95  Thus, as applied to websites, information becomes 
“public” when three elements are present: (1) the website is a recog-
nized channel of distribution, (2) information posted on the website 
becomes available to the securities marketplace, and (3) there has 
been a reasonable waiting period for the market to react to the infor-
mation.96 
Each element must be analyzed separately; with regards to the 
first element, a website is a recognized channel of distribution de-
pending on the way in which the company alerts the public of its 
website and the way it discloses information.97  As for the second el-
ement, information is validly disseminated to the market if the man-
ner in which information is posted on a website is proper and the in-
formation is accessible to investors.98  To determine whether these 
two elements are satisfied, a company should consider whether the 
market is aware of its decision to post on its website, if there is a pat-
tern for doing so, or whether the information is readily available to 
the public and the media.99  Finally, for a company to determine the 
third element, the presence of a “reasonable waiting period,” it should 
consider the size of the market following the company, the way in 
which information is accessed on the website, and the extent to which 
the market is aware of the company’s use of its website.100  If, upon 
 
94 Id. at 45,866. 
95 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites, 73 Fed. Reg. at 45,867 (quot-
ing In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 255 (1973)). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (finding that “[b]ecause companies of all sizes now have the capacity to present in-
formation on their Web sites to all investors on a broadly accessible basis, and because in-
vestors correspondingly have the capability to easily find and retrieve information about 
companies by searching the World Wide Web, we now analyze the concept of ‘dissemina-
tion’ through a changed lens.”). 
99 Id. (including many other examples as ways to determine whether the first two factors 
are satisfied). 
100 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites, 73 Fed. Reg. at 45,867-68 
(citing Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 854). 
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consideration, a company determines that the elements have been sat-
isfied, it is likely that its website would be considered a valid public 
medium for posting information for investors. 
The SEC ultimately changed its position regarding websites, 
finding that because of the growth of technology and reliance on the 
Internet, it was possible for a company to post material information 
on its website without implicating Regulation FD.101  However, the 
permission to do so was not absolute since the company still had to 
analyze the enumerated factors to determine whether its website was 
an appropriate means for disseminating information to the public.102  
This press release essentially provided guidance as to how a company 
seeking to use its website to release information could comply with 
Regulation FD; thus, there was no change in the language of the 
Regulation itself.  The SEC’s decision to reinterpret what qualifies as 
a “public disclosure” served to influence the way it determined the 
effect of social media on Regulation FD. 
D. SEC Enforcement Actions 
Although it may seem difficult for companies to comply with 
Regulation FD, the SEC rarely institutes enforcement actions on this 
basis, doing so in less than fifteen instances.103  To enforce Regula-
tion FD, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement can bring an action 
against either a company or an individual, who is usually an employ-
ee or officer of the company that is being investigated.104  “Remedies 
 
101 Id. at 45,868 (indicating that “posting of the information on the company’s Web site, in 
and of itself, may be a sufficient method of public disclosure under Rule 101(e) of Regula-
tion FD.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Vanessa Schoenthaler, Regulation FD: learn from prior SEC cases, IR WEB REPORT 
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://irwebreport.com/20110411/regulation-fd-learn-from-prior-sec-cases/ 
(listing all of the enforcement actions by the SEC from the creation of Regulation FD to 
April 2011); see also Thomas P. Giblin & Stephen H. Kinney, Recent SEC Regulation FD 
Enforcement Action Relevant to Redemptions, MORGAN LEWIS (Feb. 1, 2012), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/publicationID/43ee2fc4-6f38-4f34-9ffd-
c6a8a90c25ec/fuseaction/publication.detail (describing the SEC’s enforcement action 
against Fifth Third Bancorp regarding Regulation FD in November 2011); SEC Charges 
Former Vice President of Investor Relations With Violating Fair Disclosure Rules, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Pre 
ssRelease/1370539799034 (last visited May 2, 2014) (explaining the 2013 investigation of 
First Solar, Inc.). 
104 Schoenthaler, supra note 103 (stating that only the SEC can bring an action against the 
company).  “[T]here is no private cause of action for failing to comply with Reg FD, so a 
company’s shareholders can’t sue on the basis of a Reg FD violation alone.”  Id. 
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available to the SEC generally include injunctive relief, such as 
cease-and-desist orders, monetary penalties and required disclosure 
of the violation.”105  The remedy for all of the cases in which the SEC 
sought an enforcement action was consent to a cease-and-desist or-
der;106 a majority of the cases also resulted in a penalty, either to an 
individual, the company itself, or both, ranging from $25,000 to 
$1,000,000.107 
The companies that were charged with violating Regulation 
FD had many similarities since the SEC instituted a number of the 
investigations as a result of disclosures made to certain analysts or 
advisors, which concerned the financial stability of the company.108  
For instance, several enforcement actions resulted from selectively 
disclosed, material earnings information to analysts and institutional 
investors either in the form of estimates or guidance, and a subse-
quent failure to disclose publicly.109  Another situation in which the 
SEC sought action for violating Regulation FD was when companies 
held private meetings, only open to certain investors or analysts.110  
There were two instances in which the SEC instituted an action on 
this basis against Siebel Systems, Inc.; both actions were initiated as 
a result of the CEO’s disclosure of information at a private meeting 
regarding the company’s outlook, which was much bleaker than what 
was publicly disclosed.111 
 
105 Id. 
106 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a) (2010).  This explains the cease-and-desist proceedings: 
Authority of the Commission.  If the Commission finds, after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that any person is violating, has violated, or is 
about to violate any provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.], or 
any rule or regulation thereunder, the Commission may publish its find-
ings and enter an order requiring such person, and any other person that 
is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission 
the person knew or should have known would contribute to such viola-
tion, to cease and desist from committing or causing such violation and 
any future violation of the same provision, rule, or regulation. 
Id. 
107 Schoenthaler, supra note 103 (noting that in many instances, both the company and an 
officer of the company were issued penalties when the officer was found to be responsible or 
was aiding and abetting a violation of Regulation FD). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (including Raytheon Company, Schering-Plough Corporation, American Commer-
cial Lines, Inc., Presstek, Inc., Office Depot, Inc.). 
110 Id. (including Siebel Systems, Inc. and Flowserve Corporation). 
111 Id. (demonstrating that although Siebel Systems, Inc. was charged with the first viola-
tion, the second was ultimately dismissed since the court found that the SEC was applying 
“an excessively strict interpretation of Regulation FD.”). 
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A final situation in which the SEC has sought enforcement of 
Regulation FD is when a company alerted analysts or advisors about 
the happening of an event, such as the creation of a material contract, 
or an upcoming major development.112  For instance, in the case of 
First Solar, Inc., after the company learned that it would not receive a 
major loan, it decided not to issue a press release immediately; yet, 
employees were aware that in order to comply with Regulation FD, 
they could not discuss the matter until it was officially released.113  
However, the former vice president violated Regulation FD by secret-
ly calling approximately twenty analysts and institutional investors, 
alerting them of the news.114  While he ultimately consented to a 
cease-and-desist order, as well as a $50,000 penalty, the SEC decided 
not to bring an action against the company due to its cooperation with 
the investigation, its promptly issued press release (upon discovery of 
the phone calls), and its remedial measures to address the reprehensi-
ble conduct.115  Thus, although there have only been a small number 
of enforcement actions based on Regulation FD, it is nonetheless a 
rule that companies must be aware of and abide by, especially when 
dealing with information that has an effect on a company’s financial 
stability. 
E. Netflix Investigation & Social Media 
During the past year, the SEC conducted an investigation of 
Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix”) and its Chief Executive Officer, Reed Has-
tings, regarding whether Hastings violated Regulation FD when he 
posted potentially material, nonpublic information regarding the 
company on his personal Facebook page.116  Founded in 1997, Net-
flix is the world’s leading Internet-based television network that al-
lows subscribers to receive movies in the mail and to stream content 
through the Internet.117  On July 3, 2012, Hastings posted a message 
 
112 Schoenthaler, supra note 103 (noting that Secure Computing Company “disclosed in-
formation about a material contract to two institutional advisors.”); see also SEC Charges 
Former Vice President of Investor Relations, supra note 103 (discussing the SEC’s action 
against a former vice president of First Solar, Inc., for making private phone calls to inves-
tors regarding the status of a loan). 
113 SEC Charges Former Vice President of Investor Relations, supra note 103. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (noting, for example, that the “company conducted additional Regulation FD train-
ing for employees responsible for public disclosure.”). 
116 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 1. 
117 Company Overview, NETFLIX, https://pr.netflix.com/WebClient/loginPageSalesNetWor 
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on his personal Facebook page, triggering the SEC investigation.  
The post stated that “Netflix monthly viewing exceeded 1 billion 
hours for the first time ever in June.”118  Following the Facebook 
post, Netflix failed to either file a Form 8-K or otherwise release the 
information to the public; yet, various reporters learned of the infor-
mation hours after the post.119  Even though the news was not dissem-
inated to the broad mailing list ordinarily used for corporate press re-
leases, the result was a 15% increase in Netflix’s stock price by the 
next trading day.120  Not only has Netflix never used Hastings’s per-
sonal Facebook page in the past to release information, but Hastings 
himself stated for public record that Netflix did not use any social 
media to communicate information to investors, but rather, it is re-
leased through press releases and SEC filings.121 
In response to the investigation surrounding Netflix, the ulti-
mate decision of the SEC was to allow issuers to apply the principles 
of the 2008 Guidance to corporate disclosures released through social 
media channels.122  According to the press release on this matter, ap-
propriate social media channels may include Facebook123 and Twit-
 
ksAction.do?contentGroupId=10476&contentGroup=Company+Facts (last visited May 2, 
2014).  See also Robin Renford, Netflix 1-month Free Trial: How to Get It With No Coupons 
Required, FINANCESONLINE.COM, https://financesonline.com/netflix-1-month-free-trial-how-
to-get-it-with-no-coupons-required/ (“To use Netflix, consumers sign up for a subscription 
on the company’s website. For one low monthly price, Netflix members instantly watch un-
limited movies and TV shows streaming over the Internet to PCs, Macs and TVs via a wide 
range of devices . . . .”). 
118 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 4 (stating, further, that “[t]his announcement 
represented a nearly 50% increase in streaming hours from Netflix’s January 25, 2012 an-
nouncement that it had streamed 2 billion hours over the preceding  three-month quarter.”). 
119 Id. (finding that although this information was not publicly released, Netflix did issue a 
press release regarding its second quarter 2012 earnings following the post, but did not men-
tion the billion-hour milestone). 
120 Id. at 4-5. 
121 Id. at 5 (asserting that although Hastings’s Facebook page had over 200,000 subscrib-
ers, which included “equity research analysts associated with registered broker-dealers, 
shareholders, reporters, and bloggers[,]” there was no previous indication that his personal 
page would be used to announce company information). 
122 Id. (affirming that “the principles outlined in the 2008 Guidance—and specifically the 
concept that the investing public should be alerted to the channels of distribution a company 
will use to disseminate material information—apply with equal force to corporate disclo-
sures made through social media channels.”). 
123 Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited May 2, 
2014) (stating that Facebook’s mission is to “give people the power to share and make the 
world more open and connected.  People use Facebook to stay connected with friends and 
family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to 
them.”). 
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ter,124 so long as investors are alerted as to which websites will be 
used.125  To ensure that a particular social media website is an ac-
ceptable means of communicating, investors must be aware of a 
company’s decision to use social media and access to the sites cannot 
be restricted.126  Further, although every case is analyzed on its par-
ticular facts, it is unlikely that the personal social media websites of 
officers or employees would qualify to be an appropriate means for 
disseminating information to the public.127  Overall, the SEC has 
found that because a number of companies have increased their use 
of social media to interact with the investing public, issuers are now 
permitted to release public information through social media sites, 
provided that they continue to comply with Regulation FD and the 
2008 Guidance.128 
III. CONTROVERSY AND ISSUES SURROUNDING SOCIAL MEDIA 
Although numerous companies are already using social media 
in their businesses, many of them are of the opinion that “social me-
dia is an experiment, as they try to understand how to best use the 
different channels, gauge their effectiveness, and integrate social me-
dia into their strategy.”129  The fact of the matter is that many busi-
nesses are not aware of how to use social media productively for 
marketing their business, not to mention how to successfully comply 
with SEC regulations.  Therefore, the SEC’s decision to permit the 
use of social media to comply with Regulation FD130 may come with 
a few setbacks due to the possible downsides of using social media 
and the potential concerns of investors.  Another possible problem 
 
124 About, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited May 2, 2014) (stating 
that Twitter’s mission is to “give everyone the power to create and share ideas and infor-
mation instantly, without barriers.”). 
125 SEC Says Social Media OK for Company Announcements if Investors Are Alerted, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detai 
l/PressRelease/1365171513574#.Un5-0XCsiSp (last visited May 2, 2014). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (finding that although Hastings posted on his personal Facebook page, “[t]he SEC 
did not initiate an enforcement action or allege wrongdoing by Hastings or Netflix [due to 
the] market uncertainty about the application of Regulation FD to social media”). 
128 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 8. 
129 The New Conversation: Taking Social Media from Talk to Action, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(2010), http://www.sas.com/resources/whitepaper/wp_23348.pdf at 1-2 (finding that of 
2,100 companies surveyed, 58% are already using social media, whereas 21% are preparing 
to use social media). 
130 SEC Says Social Media OK, supra note 125. 
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with this decision is the SEC’s reluctance to specify which social 
media websites are permitted and what type of information can be re-
leased.  Thus, in order for businesses to successfully adhere to Regu-
lation FD, they must make themselves aware of these potential issues 
and learn how to use social media effectively. 
A. Investor Concerns 
The growing use of social media to release important infor-
mation raises concerns for investors because they have yet another 
medium that they must periodically check for company updates.  This 
places a burden on investors to ensure they are subscribed with social 
media websites, as well as learn the essential features of each.  Addi-
tionally, the overflow of information in the market could ultimately 
lead to negative effects such as increased market volatility or less 
disclosure, leaving investors in an inferior position.  Finally, major 
privacy concerns can arise by imposing a burden on investors to reg-
ister with social media websites.  Providing personal information to 
numerous websites increases an investor’s exposure to hackers and 
threatens his expectation of privacy.  Investors must be aware of the-
se potential concerns when considering new ventures. 
Permitting the use of social media for disclosing material, 
nonpublic information not only places a burden on investors to sub-
scribe to social media websites, but they must also be cognizant of 
company updates.  This raises a concern for those smaller investors 
who may not be familiar with the different social media websites and 
their different uses, therefore, giving them a disadvantage in the mar-
ket, which clearly goes against the intent of Regulation FD.  By con-
cluding that social media is an appropriate public forum, the SEC is 
essentially finding that disclosures are non-exclusionary even when 
companies require investors to subscribe or register in order to re-
ceive the released information.131  In essence, in order for all inves-
tors to get the same access to market information, they are first com-
 
131 Richard J. Sandler, How to Use Social Media for Regulation FD Compliance, THE 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(Apr. 16, 2013, 9:44 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/04/16/how-to-use-
social-media-for-regulation-fd-compliance/ (confirming that subscription-based websites can 
be used for Regulation FD purposes, clearing up “a lingering concern that requiring an in-
vestor to subscribe, register or otherwise ‘opt in’ to receive disclosures, even where no pay-
ment is required, might violate the Regulation FD imperative that disclosure be made on a 
‘non-exclusionary’ basis.”). 
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pelled to register with the relevant social media websites. 
Another concern for investors is social media’s effect on mar-
ket volatility, as well as the amount of disclosure in the market, since 
too much disclosure may ultimately lead to less disclosure overall.  
When Regulation FD was first proposed, companies and investors 
were apprehensive that the new rule would have the opposite effect 
of its purpose by reducing the flow of information because companies 
would choose not to release the information at all.132  In turn, analysts 
would be worse off because they would lose their competitive ad-
vantage in the market, and stockholders would be at a disadvantage 
since there would be less information available.133  As anticipated, af-
ter Regulation FD’s adoption, there were two negative effects on the 
market—one was increased market volatility, and the other was that 
analyst coverage of smaller companies declined.134 
Allowing social media to be an appropriate means for distrib-
uting information could lead to the same result as the initial adoption 
of Regulation FD: Too much disclosure may ultimately lead to com-
panies avoiding social media and in turn limiting the information re-
leased to the market.  Essentially, because there will be even more 
disclosure through social media channels than when Regulation FD 
was first adopted,135 the negative effects that occurred in 2000 will be 
amplified.  Undeniably, if these effects were to happen yet again, in-
vestors would be at a disadvantage since there will be less available 
information in the market. 
Another major disadvantage to using social media is the threat 
of privacy concerns that can arise for the investors.  “When a social 
media user disseminates his postings and information to the public, 
they are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.”136  There can be 
 
132 Steven M. Davidoff, In Netflix Case, a Chance to Re-examine Old Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2012, 7:13 PM, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/in-netflix-case-a-chance-
for-the-s-e-c-to-re-examine-old-regulation/?_r=0. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (finding that because “there was now less information in the market about these 
smaller companies, investors subsequently demanded a bigger premium to invest, increasing 
financing costs.”). 
135 Id. (stating that “allowing executives to comment freely on Facebook and Twitter, rec-
ognizing them as a public space akin to a news release, is almost certain to result in more 
disclosure, not less, and reach many more people than an S.E.C. filing would.  The agency’s 
position will only force executives to check with lawyers and avoid social media, chilling 
disclosure.”). 
136 United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
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no reasonable expectation of privacy when a social media user sets 
his privacy settings to public because he intends that whoever wishes 
to read the information posted may be free to do so.137  Although a 
user with a private setting has a “more colorable argument about the 
reasonable expectation of privacy,” the user is nonetheless dissemi-
nating information to the public and, therefore, remains unprotected 
by the Fourth Amendment.138  Thus, regardless of a user’s privacy 
setting, a company or investor who provides information on a social 
media website does not have any privacy protections. 
A security concern for investors will be the requirement that 
they register with the applicable social media pages in order to re-
ceive the latest information that the company releases.  Being com-
pelled to register in order to gain access to material news will create 
security risks for users, which may jeopardize market stability.139  
Registration for a social media site such as Facebook requires the us-
er to create a password and provide his first and last name, email ad-
dress, birthday, and gender.140  This creates a safety concern as users 
are obligated to provide a personal email address, which other users 
may have access to.  If a user forgets his registered name on Face-
book, he can enter some personal information to retrieve his profile; 
however, users can potentially use the same technique to discover 
other users’ private information, such as their photo, name, or clues 
about a private email.141  Although many users choose to keep their 
profile private, this type of search may still produce private infor-
mation, as Facebook technically classifies a user’s photo and name as 
public information.142 
Evidently, supplying personal information may leave one vul-
nerable to hackers, and “[a]lthough hacking and other breaches of in-
formation security can be posed in multiple ways, [the] use of social 
media . . . may pose elevated risks.”143  Hacking is a concern for 
 
137 Rosario v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No 2:13-CV-362 JCM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93963, at *15 (D. Nev. July 3, 2013). 
138 Id. at *16. 
139 Palazzo, supra note 19 (finding, further, that “the SEC allowing the use of social media 
to disclose financial information ‘poses a disservice to the investment community, threaten-
ing increased fragmentation of price-sensitive information.’ ”). 
140 Sign Up, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited May 2, 2014). 
141 Adam Tanner, Facebook Backdoor Gives Clues To Private Email Addresses, FORBES 
(Jan. 17, 2014, 9:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2014/01/17/facebook-
backdoor-gives-clues-to-private-email-addresses/. 
142 Id. 
143 National Examination Risk Alert, Investment Advisor Use of Social Media, at 5 (Jan. 4, 
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those investors who must create a personal page to access the compa-
ny’s updates.  Additionally, Nexgate, a company specializing in so-
cial media security, found that spam grew by 355% in the first half of 
2013 across popular social networks.144  It found that Facebook was 
one of the most infected sites, containing spam in roughly 1 of every 
200 social messages.145  Facebook is also the source of the largest 
number of phishing attacks, where hackers trick users into providing 
passwords or other personal information.146  Overall, the use of social 
media to comply with Regulation FD is likely to raise concerns for 
investors by requiring them to become knowledgeable of social me-
dia, creating a disadvantage to them because of the possible effects 
on market information, and exposing them to privacy concerns. 
B. Issuer Concerns 
Major problems can arise for issuers as a result of the SEC’s 
decision to allow the utilization of social media because of the vari-
ous disadvantages to using social media websites.  For instance, 
many corporate executives are not aware of how to properly incorpo-
rate social media into their marketing strategy, which could create 
many setbacks for those companies.  Further, the use of social media 
websites gives rise to the risk of misinformation in the market, poten-
tially due to unverified postings.  Thus, in order to prevent the dis-
semination of wrong or incomplete information to investors, compa-
nies must be aware of how to monitor what is being shared on the 
sites.  Finally, companies must also be aware of the privacy concerns 
that can arise in the event that one of their accounts gets hacked. 
A 2012 study conducted by the Stanford Graduate School of 
Business showed that many corporate executives were not well-
educated with regards to using social media in their business or even 
to release pertinent information.147  According to the survey, there 
 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/riskalert-socialmedia.pdf. 
144 Christopher Zara, Facebook Spam And YouTube Spam Rampant, Says 2013 Social 
Media Spam Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/fac 
ebook-spam-youtube-spam-rampant-says-2013-social-media-spam-report-1414506. 
145 Id. (finding further that “Facebook and Google’s YouTube were the most infected, 
containing more spam than other social networks by a ratio of 100 to 1”). 
146 Id. 
147 2012 Social Media Survey, STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS: CENTER FOR 
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH (2012), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cldr/researc 
h/surveys/social.html (demonstrating corporate executives’ lack of knowledge regarding the 
use of social media, according to a survey conducted in 2012). 
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was a disconnect between companies’ apparent understanding of so-
cial media and the lack of action that they were taking to incorporate 
it into their business strategy.148  An alarmingly small percentage of 
the companies surveyed utilized metrics from social media to meas-
ure their corporate performance.149  Although this survey was con-
ducted over a year ago, it is probable that executives still have a lack 
of knowledge regarding the process of utilizing social media to col-
lect information to enhance their corporate strategy.  By failing to ef-
fectively utilize social media channels, companies risk losing control 
of their product branding, corporate reputation, and proprietary in-
formation.150  The SEC’s decision to permit social media websites to 
be used as a public forum will, therefore, create a disadvantage for 
those companies who lack the requisite knowledge on how to incor-
porate the sites into their business.  Because those competitors who 
are knowledgeable of social media outlets will have a significant ad-
vantage, the new interpretation might give those struggling compa-
nies incentive to get up to speed. 
Another disadvantage could be that the increased use of social 
media may lead to the sharing of misinformation, which could have a 
negative effect on the stock market by creating more volatile stock 
prices.151  Undoubtedly, misinformation in the market would have a 
negative impact for companies if investors were receiving the wrong 
information and, consequently, they made an improper investment 
decision.  The most likely cause of leaked misinformation is unveri-
fied postings, either by employees, third parties, or hackers.  Some 
unauthorized posts may be harmless with regards to the effect on the 
market; yet, it might otherwise negatively affect a company’s reputa-
tion.  For instance, a Red Cross social media specialist inadvertently 
sent a tweet from the Red Cross’ Twitter account regarding drinking 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. (“While 90% of respondents claim to understand the impact that social media can 
have on their organization, only 32% of their companies monitor social media to detect risks 
to their business activities and 14% use metrics from social media to measure corporate per-
formance.”). 
150 James McRitchie, Video Friday: Use of Social Media By Senior & Board Level Execu-
tives is Pitiful, CORPGOV.NET (Nov. 2, 2012), http://corpgov.net/2012/11/video-friday-use-
of-social-media-by-senior-board-level-executives-is-pitiful/ (summarizing the information 
collected from the Stanford School of Business survey). 
151 Serena Ehrlich, Understanding the True Risks of Utilizing Social Media for Financial 
Disclosures, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 8, 2013, 7:31 AM), http://blog.businesswire.com/2013/10/ 
08/understanding-the-true-risks-of-utilizing-social-media-for-financial-disclosure/. 
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beer and getting intoxicated.152  Although this tweet obviously did not 
affect the market, the Red Cross’ reputation was compromised, as it 
is a respected humanitarian organization. 
However, not all unauthorized tweets are harmless, especially 
in a case where an account was hacked, which is a serious threat for 
companies.  The stock market fell sharply after a fake tweet by the 
Associated Press alerted viewers of an attack on the White House, in-
juring President Obama.153  Because many traders are constantly fol-
lowing Twitter updates for news that could affect the stock markets, 
after the news of an explosion, the Dow Jones industrial average 
plummeted 100 points within two minutes.154  After the Associated 
Press confirmed that its Twitter account was hacked, the market re-
bounded quickly, demonstrating how vulnerable the stock market is 
to technological glitches.155  Other examples of misinformation in the 
market as a result of hacking are the cases of Burger King and Jeep; 
both of their Twitter accounts spread false posts that they were 
bought out by a rival company.156 
Misinformation can also arise through a third party posting on 
a company’s social media page and issues may arise as to whether the 
company is liable for what is posted.  Many firms allow third parties 
to post messages and hyperlinks on their social media sites; whereas, 
others establish policies limiting third party use to authorized users 
only, excluding the general public.157  Firms should consider posting 
disclaimers on their sites, affirming that they do not endorse any 
 
152 Dean Praetorius, The Red Cross’ Rogue Tweet: #gettngslizzerd On Dogfish Head’s 
Midas Touch, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2011, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/16/red-cross-rogue-tweet_n_824114.html (stating 
that the tweet said “Ryan found two more 4 bottle packs of Dogfish Head’s Midas Touch 
beer. . . . [sic] when we drink we do it right #gettngslizzerd.”).  After the incident, the Red 
Cross apologized, and Dogfish Head Brewery responded with tweets encouraging donations 
be made to the Red Cross.  Id. 
153 Dina ElBoghdady, Market quavers after fake AP tweet says Obama was hurt in White 
House explosions, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ec 
onomy/market-quavers-after-fake-ap-tweet-says-obama-was-hurt-in-white-house-explosions/ 
2013/04/23/d96d2dc6-ac4d-11e2-a8b9-2a63d75b5459_story.html. 
154 Id. (stating further that the effect was not just on the stock market, but the fake tweet 
also affected the bond and commodity markets, as if the market reacted before anyone could 
even process what had happened). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  See also Dino Grandoni, Jeep Twitter Account Hacked Day After Similar Attack 
On Burger King, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co 
m/2013/02/19/jeep-twitter-hack_n_2718653.html. 
157 Investment Advisor Use of Social Media, supra note 143, at 5. 
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communications posted by third parties, therefore avoiding liabil-
ity.158  Thus, regardless of who is posting the false information, com-
panies must be aware of this potential issue because misinformation 
leaked into the market can have a significant impact on stock prices. 
Aside from the major disadvantages noted above, another 
drawback of using social media is a lack of visibility of important 
updates, which could affect the success of using social media as a 
form of disclosure.  Many company updates will not be seen by its 
followers since approximately “84% of Facebook newsfeed stories 
are never seen and 71% of tweets are ignored.”159  Further, there will 
always be a potential for platform volatility due to the high probabil-
ity that the website could go offline.160  Finally, the use of social me-
dia sites could result in delayed access to news since “[s]ocial net-
works are unable to confirm equal visibility of news and tweets, 
making it very easy for trades to be made before the news has fully 
been disseminated.”161  Consequently, there are numerous downsides 
to using social media websites and companies must be aware of these 
potential threats if they choose to utilize them as a means of dissemi-
nating information. 
C. Concerns With Implementation 
The SEC has decided that its 2008 Guidance now applies not 
only to company websites, but also to “current and evolving social 
media channels of corporate communication.”162  This language 
leaves many unanswered questions, such as which social media sites 
may be used and how companies may alert investors of their deci-
sions to use them.  The SEC defines “social media” as “an umbrella 
term that encompasses various activities that integrate technology, 
social interaction and content creation.  Social media may use many 
technologies, including, but not limited to, blogs, microblogs, wikis, 
photos and video sharing, podcasts, social networking, and virtual 
worlds.”163  However, although the definition of social media is 
 
158 Id. 
159 Ehrlich, supra note 151. 
160 Id. (finding that “social networks sometimes go offline.  Whether it is for system 
maintenance, too much volume or a DOS attack, when you choose to disclose over a social 
network, you put yourself at the mercy of a network only a handful of years old.”). 
161 Id. 
162 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 8. 
163 Investment Advisor Use of Social Media, supra note 143, at 1 n.2. 
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known, it is unclear which types of social media sites are acceptable.  
The SEC has expressly stated that “companies can use social media 
outlets like Facebook and Twitter to announce key information,”164 
but it failed to comment on the applicability of any other types of so-
cial media.  The most common categories of social media are social 
networks, such as Facebook, where a user can connect with friends 
and others with similar interests through a profile, and microblogging 
sites such as Twitter, where users can provide short updates automat-
ically sent out to anyone who has subscribed to receive them.165  Oth-
ers include bookmarking sites, which allow users to save, organize, 
and manage hyperlinks around the Internet; social news sites, which 
allow users to post a wide-variety of news, and the most popular sto-
ries among users are displayed first; media sharing sites, which allow 
users to upload and share media such as pictures and videos; and 
blogs and forums, which allow users to have conversations by post-
ing messages.166 
Although the SEC has expressly permitted the use of Face-
book and Twitter, what about the other social media channels?  Cur-
rently, Instagram,167 a media sharing site that allows users to take 
photos and videos and share them with friends, is the world’s fastest-
growing social network and had an increase in users by 23% in 2013 
alone.168  Since Regulation FD now applies to social media the same 
way in which it applies to company websites,169 is a company there-
fore now permitted to post a picture of its quarterly earnings on its 
Instagram page?  It is unlikely that this is what the SEC was suggest-
ing when it approved the use of social media channels to comply with 
Regulation FD.  Companies must be cognizant of this issue, and be 
sure to use only those social media channels that would classify as an 
effective means for disseminating information to investors. 
 
164 SEC Says Social Media OK, supra note 125 (stating, further, that “[t]he Securities and 
Exchange Commission today issued a report that makes clear that companies can use social 
media outlets like Facebook and Twitter to announce key information in compliance with 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) so long as investors have been alerted about 
which social media will be used to disseminate such information.”). 
165 Tim Grahl, The 6 Types of Social Media, OUT:THINK, http://outthinkgroup.com/tips/the 
-6-types-of-social-media. 
166 Id. 
167 FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (last visited May 2, 2014). 
168 Instagram surges ahead as world’s fastest-growing social network, CTV NEWS (Jan. 
22, 2014, 1:12 PM), http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/instagram-surges-ahead-as-world-s-
fastest-growing-social-network-1.1650961. 
169 SEC Says Social Media OK, supra note 125. 
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Further, it is unclear whether a company executive’s personal 
social media account would be an appropriate source for releasing 
corporate information to the public.  Without notice to investors that 
the site would be used for such a purpose, the SEC has deemed it un-
likely to qualify as an acceptable medium, regardless of the individu-
al’s number of subscribers.170  Thus, even if a company is using an 
acceptable type of social media, it must be sure to direct users to the 
corporate social media page, as opposed to the page of any individual 
employee. 
Another issue that the SEC left unanswered is how companies 
should go about informing the public of their decision to use social 
media as a public forum.  Although a company may disseminate in-
formation through a social media channel that it believes will distrib-
ute information broadly and non-exclusively, it can only do so if it 
has already informed the public of its intentions to use the site.171  
Alerting the public of these channels is critical for the fairness of the 
markets; otherwise, “the investing public would be forced to keep 
pace with a changing and expanding universe of potential disclosure 
channels, a virtually impossible task.”172  However, it is unclear ex-
actly how companies should go about alerting investors, as well as 
the market in general, of this decision. 
One way to provide appropriate notice, as the SEC suggests, 
is for the company to identify the specific social media channels that 
it intends to use on its corporate website, thereby giving investors the 
opportunity to learn how to receive updates directly from the social 
media sites.173  The company may also consider providing hyperlinks 
on its corporate website to easily direct the viewer to the applicable 
social media page.174  Further, because the SEC is silent as to other 
 
170 Report of Investigation, supra note 4, at 7-8 (discussing further that “[p]ersonal social 
media sites of individuals employed by a public company would not ordinarily be assumed 
to be channels through which the company would disclose material corporate information.  
Without adequate notice that such a site may be used for this purpose, investors would not 
have an opportunity to access this information or, in some cases, would not know of that op-
portunity, at the same time as other investors.”). 
171 Id. at 7. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (finding that “disclosures on corporate web sites identifying the specific social me-
dia channels a company intends to use for the dissemination of material non-public infor-
mation would give investors and the markets the opportunity to take the steps necessary to 
be in a position to receive important disclosures—e.g., subscribing, joining, registering, or 
reviewing that particular channel.”). 
174 See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN, https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan (last visited May 
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methods for providing notice to investors, companies could consider 
“including a statement in their press releases and other public reports 
that specifically refers to the company’s social media accounts as a 
source for important information about the firm.”175  For instance, In-
vestment Technology Group, Inc, a brokerage firm, issued a press re-
lease regarding its intent to disclose information on social media 
channels to comply with Regulation FD.176  Similarly, Marchex, Inc., 
a mobile advertising technology firm, recently filed a Form 8-K to 
announce that it intends on using its Twitter account and company 
blog to disclose information about the company in the future to suc-
cessfully comply with Regulation FD.177 
“[A] public disclosure is not about being public but about be-
ing made where investors [know] the company regularly release[s] 
investor information.”178  Essentially, in order to make a social media 
page a recognized channel of distribution, companies need to create a 
pattern of posting such information on the social media site.179  The 
company cannot instead post regularly to multiple different sources 
to release information, as it would be unreasonable to expect inves-
 
2, 2014) (noting that the company provides links on the bottom of the homepage to all of its 
social media pages, including Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, and Facebook; clicking on the 
hyperlink redirects the user to the appropriate social media page). 
175 Rajib Chanda & Steve Zaorski, Social Media Usage in the Financial Services Indus-
try: Toward a Business-Driven Compliance Approach, J. TAXATION & REG. FIN. 
INSTITUTIONS, May/June 2013, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/13_seclaw_03.pdf. 
176 Form 8-K: Investment Technology Group, Inc., File Number 001-32722 (Aug. 8, 
2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/920424/000110465913061510/a13-18279_1 
8k.htm. 
177 Form 8-K: Marchex, Inc., File Number 000-50658 (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1224133/000119312513427676/d621951d8k.htm. 
Investors and others should note that we announce material fi-
nancial information to our investors using our investor relations website, 
press releases, SEC filings and public conference calls and webcasts. 
Marchex intends to also use the following social media channels as a 
means of disclosing information about the company . . . and for comply-
ing with its disclosure obligations under Regulation FD: 
Marchex Twitter Account (twitter.com/marchex) 
Marchex Company Blog (blog.marchex.com) 
The information we post through these social media channels may be 
deemed material.  Accordingly, investors should monitor the account 
and the blog mentioned above, in addition to following Marchex’s press 
releases, SEC filings and public conference calls and webcasts. 
Id. at Item 8.01. 
178 Davidoff, supra note 132. 
179 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites, 73 Fed. Reg. at 45,867. 
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tors to check all possible sources.  As a result, in order to release in-
formation on a social media site, a firm can only comply with Regu-
lation FD by establishing a pattern and alerting the market of its in-
tentions to do so.  It can notify investors either by announcing it on a 
corporate webpage, noting it in company press releases, or including 
it in SEC filings. 
IV. IMPROVEMENTS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
It is apparent that there are numerous concerns surrounding 
the SEC’s decision to implement a social media policy for Regulation 
FD.  In order to mitigate these concerns, there are a number of im-
provements that can be enacted both by the SEC and by issuers of se-
curities.  The SEC must determine a better method for executing the 
social media policy, and issuers must learn how to effectively and 
appropriately use social media channels. 
A. Suggestions for the SEC to Improve 
Implementation 
The SEC’s first step should be to issue a guidance concerning 
how companies can effectively use social media to comply with Reg-
ulation FD.  Although the SEC had intended the 2008 Guidance re-
garding company websites to govern social media sites as well, more 
specific guidelines are necessary.  Primarily, the SEC should express-
ly state which social media websites are appropriate; or, alternatively, 
limit a company’s use to only two options: Facebook or Twitter, the 
most commonly used social media platforms.  Because it is unrealis-
tic to expect investors to subscribe to all social media platforms that a 
company may utilize, limiting them to just two alleviates the burden 
on investors.  Additionally, the SEC was overly vague in its report 
regarding how companies can go about informing the public of its in-
tent to use social media.  Again, the SEC needs to be more specific 
and state exactly the appropriate means.  As previously suggested, it 
is more logical to require companies to alert the public through one 
particular medium, such as by filing a Form 8-K.  By creating uni-
formity across all companies, a standard will be created, and the oc-
currence of a violation would be clear. 
The SEC should also consider addressing the level of materi-
ality that is appropriate on social media platforms.  Although compa-
nies can now post material, nonpublic information on their social 
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media pages, should they be allowed to post major news regarding an 
important company event?  For example, it is doubtful that many in-
vestors would find it appropriate for a corporation to alert the public 
of a merger in a casual Facebook post.  Consequently, it would be 
reasonable for the SEC to limit the type of information that can be 
disseminated on a social media site by enumerating those announce-
ments that must be revealed through a filing. 
Another suggestion that the SEC may consider is to redesign 
EDGAR,180 its database for company filings, in order to mirror Face-
book or Twitter in design; consequently, the investing public could 
simply subscribe to the EDGAR postings.181  “The Commission 
would then become part of the social network rather than in tension 
with the social network.”182  Under these circumstances, EDGAR 
would act as the primary social media page and investors would re-
ceive updates automatically, without the complications of using other 
mediums.  By mimicking other social media platforms, companies 
would get the same benefits because investors would be able to sub-
scribe to their pages and receive the same updates.  Although the 
SEC may not be interested in redesigning its website, it would be ad-
vantageous to do so because it would reduce the number of Regula-
tion FD violations and could potentially make its system more effi-
cient. 
By transforming EDGAR into a social media page, the SEC 
would better serve the policies of Regulation FD.  Most importantly, 
creating its own social media page would accomplish the overall pur-
pose of Regulation FD: all investors would be on a level playing field 
since all available information would be accessible on one website.  
In such a case, when a company releases material information, all of 
the investors subscribed to the company would get the news at the 
same time.  This would also eliminate the need for investors to worry 
about subscribing to multiple social media sites.  Concurrently, many 
of the privacy risks that arise regarding sites such as Facebook or 
Twitter would be eliminated.  Investors would only need to register 
 
180 Filings & Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/ 
edgar.shtml (last visited May 2, 2014) (clarifying that “[a]ll companies, foreign and domes-
tic, are required to file registration statements, periodic reports, and other forms electronical-
ly through EDGAR.  Anyone can access and download this information for free.”). 
181 Joseph A. Grundfest, Regulation FD in the Age of Facebook and Twitter: Should the 
SEC Sue Netflix? 33-34 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper 
No. 131, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209525##. 
182 Id. at 34. 
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with the SEC’s page, presumably a more secure network, and would 
not be required to create their own profile, which would be reserved 
for companies. 
Another issue that would be eliminated with the creation of 
the SEC’s own social media page is the concern regarding the termi-
nology used in the SEC’s announcement defining the acceptable use 
of social media.  There would be no need for clarification as to what 
the SEC intended to constitute “social media,” nor would there be a 
need for companies to alert the public of its intention to use the site.  
Finally, there would be a substantial decrease in the risk of misinfor-
mation in the market as a result of unauthorized postings.  Only com-
panies would have access to the page, ensuring complete and accu-
rate disclosure of information.  This would, in turn, have a positive 
effect on the markets by reducing volatility and guaranteeing their in-
tegrity.  In general, the SEC’s implementation of its own social media 
platform would successfully serve the purpose of Regulation FD, 
while also eliminating risks posed by traditional social media plat-
forms. 
B. Suggestions for Issuers 
Although issuers of securities do not have a voice in the mat-
ter, there are various measures that they can take to make implemen-
tation of a social media policy more effective.  For instance, compa-
nies could consider enlisting the help of a business like KCSA 
Strategic Communications, a financial communications firm that in-
tegrates investor relations and brand marketing.183  KCSA recently 
formed an investor relations group “dedicated to helping public com-
panies develop social media policies to ensure compliance with Reg-
ulation [FD].”184  The policy group is focused on helping companies 
conduct social media audits in order to determine whether their inves-
tors are even engaging in social media.185  Once a determination is 
 
183 Overview, KCSA, http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa_overview.asp (last visited May 2, 2014). 
184 News: KCSA Strategic Communications Forms Social Media Investor Relations Policy 
Group, KCSA, http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa_news_051313.asp (last visited May 2, 2014) 
(stating that “[KCSA’s CEO] has taken an active role in advocating for further clarity from 
the SEC on what steps public companies should take to incorporate social media into their 
IR communications.”). 
185 Id. (confirming that this should be companies’ main focus right now).  “Given the lack 
of clarity from the SEC, companies are now considering which channels to use—Twitter, 
Facebook, Stockr, Blogs, etc.  Until the SEC provides further direction, the channel is not 
what companies should be focusing on.”  Id. 
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made, it recommends that companies develop a social media policy, 
explicitly stating how it intends to utilize social media for their com-
munications regarding investor relations.186  In assisting companies 
with this process, KCSA not only helps establish a policy, but also 
ensures that companies understand how to comply with Regulation 
FD.187  Further, KCSA conducted a study regarding Fortune 100 
companies’ effectiveness at using social media communications and 
found that 90% of them received a grade of “F,”188 suggesting that 
many companies could afford to get some assistance from specialists. 
Accordingly, companies who wish to utilize social media as a 
means for disseminating information should consider contacting a 
consulting group for guidance on how to successfully comply with 
Regulation FD.  Meeting with the consulting group would not only 
ensure Regulation FD compliance, but it would improve companies’ 
investor relations strategies as well.  By using consulting groups, 
companies would learn how to effectively use social media, while al-
so understanding what exactly constitutes a Regulation FD violation.  
Because the SEC’s guidance regarding social media has been vague, 
companies could gain some clarity through this measure.  Therefore, 
issuers should consider this easy solution when looking for ways in 
which to obtain guidance when struggling with the use of social me-
dia. 
Another viable option for companies is to download a product 
called Nexgate, a cloud-based social media tool that integrates the 
company’s social media accounts to reduce risk, protect the compa-
ny’s brand, and ensure regulatory compliance.189  Nexgate simplifies 
compliance and risk management for social media sites by allowing 
the company to manage the apps that are connected to its social me-
dia, while also “significantly reduc[ing] the chances of a hack, com-
pliance violation or employee error that could result in significant 
 
186 Id. 
187 Id. (“The important thing to keep in mind is that social media is only a means to ac-
complishing an end. The end, of course, is compliance with Reg FD.”). 
188 News: 90% of Companies Fail to Use Social Media for Investor Relations, KCSA, 
http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa_news_121213.asp (last visited May 2, 2014) (“The letter grades 
are based on four criteria (SEC filing on social media intentions, IR-specific social channels, 
etc.)—all of which are necessary to receive an A grade in the new Index.  The fourth element 
in a successful strategy, according to KCSA, is a mobile app specific to Investor Relations . . 
. .”). 
189 Discover, Monitor, and Protect Your Social Media, NEXGATE, http://nexgate.com/prod 
ucts/overview/ (last visited May 2, 2014). 
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damage to [its] brand.”190  It automatically scans content and searches 
for violations and will notify the company in real-time of any issues, 
ensuring compliance with the leading social media regulatory re-
quirements.191  Additionally, it also monitors the social media pages 
for account tampering and hacks, and automatically removes any un-
authorized content.192 
Further, Nexgate has recently announced a new policy “de-
signed to automatically detect, stop, intelligently archive, and report 
when content that constitutes an . . . SEC Regulation FD violation . . . 
is posted, tweeted, shared, or messaged using a social media ac-
count.”193  The program is enacted across all of a company’s social 
media platforms and can automatically detect and remedy violations 
by ensuring any material news comes from an authorized disclosure 
account.194  Clearly, this service would be an efficient solution to the 
issue of utilizing social media to comply with Regulation FD.  Com-
panies would no longer spend time searching for Regulation FD vio-
lations, as the service would automatically detect and correct them.  
Additionally, it would be a beneficial service for all companies who 
wish to protect themselves against hackers and other unauthorized 
content, another potential concern for all users of social media. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s decision to allow social media as a public forum 
coincides with the evolving nature of technology and the way in 
which people retrieve information.  With the emergence of the social 
media industry, the SEC is forced to amend outdated rules to ensure 
they remain relevant and practical.  Consequently, the SEC’s decision 
to endorse social media is likely due to the fact that social media has 
 
190 Social Media Risk + Compliance, NEXGATE, http://nexgate.com/solutions/social-
media-risk-compliance/ (last visited May 2, 2014). 
191 Id. (stating that “Nexgate comes pre-built with policy templates and reports for some 
of the leading social media regulatory requirements . . . .”).  Companies can select a policy or 
create its own, and customize the remediation action, regarding notifications.  Id.  Nexgate 
then automatically scans content across all of a company’s social media sites, applies the 
policy, and provides detailed reports of its findings.  Id. 
192 Social Patrol From Nexgate, NEXGATE, http://nexgate.com/products/socialpatrol-
protect-your-social-media/ (last visited May 2, 2014). 
193 Nexgate Reveals Stats on Over 100 Million Pieces of Social Media Data, NEXGATE, 
http://nexgate.com/press-releases/nexgate-reveals-stats-on-over-100-million-pieces-of-
social-media-data/ (last visited May 2, 2014). 
194 Id. 
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become a major part of the average person’s everyday life.  That be-
ing said, it is probable that this is what the SEC based its interpreta-
tion on, presuming that a majority of companies, as well as investors, 
are amongst the 1.19 billion users on Facebook.195 
It is evident that the SEC intended to serve the overall pur-
pose of Regulation FD with its interpretation, yet it is unclear wheth-
er it actually does.  Regulation FD was first created in order to ad-
dress the problem of companies disclosing material, nonpublic 
information to select persons, as opposed to the public at large.196  
Thus, the SEC’s entire rationale for proposing Regulation FD was to 
create a level playing field for all investors, regardless of size and 
power; otherwise, the integrity of the markets could no longer be 
trusted.197  However, by permitting companies to use social media, 
there is a burden on investors to regularly monitor all of the forums in 
which a company chooses to post information.  Additionally, inves-
tors are now exposed to privacy concerns by putting themselves at 
risk of cybercrimes. 
Although deeming social media an appropriate public medi-
um corresponds with the changes in society and technology, it is un-
likely that investors are better off.  Larger investment firms, nonethe-
less, have an advantage over those smaller, individual investors, in 
that they are usually staffed with social media analysts who are con-
stantly checking for updates.  Consequently, at this point in time, the 
SEC is not serving the overall purpose of Regulation FD, and it must 
establish some modifications in order to do so. 
Overall, the SEC’s decision to permit companies to post im-
portant information on social media for purposes of alerting the pub-
lic is revolutionary.  The SEC is conforming to the changing views of 
society due to the emergence of the social media industry and the 
growing reliance on the Internet in general.  Although it seems ap-
propriate for this to be the next step in Regulation FD’s evolution, it 
has also come with various shortcomings.  For one, the SEC’s vague 
language regarding the permissibility of social media needs to be rec-
tified.  More significantly, the issues of privacy concerns and the po-
tential for misinformation in the market need to be addressed to en-
 
195 Salvador Rodriguez, Could Facebook really lose 80% of users by 2017? Not likely, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2014, 1:39 PM, http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-
facebook-lose-80-users-2017-not-likely-20140122,0,5369746.story#axzz2rpE0DM00. 
196 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591. 
197 Id. at 72,592. 
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sure the continued integrity of the markets.  The SEC should consider 
revising its previous statement regarding social media by making 
clarifications and, perhaps, some alterations as well.  The suggested 
modifications would not only make the permissible uses of social 
media more clear, but would also reduce the risk of some investors 
getting information first, the overall purpose of Regulation FD. 
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